Dimensional analysis of the Halstead metrics

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

One of the driving forces behind the Halstead complexity metrics was physics envy; the early reports by Halstead use the terms software physics and software science.

One very simple, and effective technique used by scientists and engineers to check whether an equation makes sense, is dimensional analysis. The basic idea is that when performing an operation between two variables, their measurement units must be consistent; for instance, two lengths can be added, but a length and a time cannot be added (a length can be divided by time, returning distance traveled per unit time, i.e., velocity).

Let’s run a dimensional analysis check on the Halstead equations.

The input variables to the Halstead metrics are: eta_1, the number of distinct operators, eta_2, the number of distinct operands, N_1, the total number of operators, and N_2, the total number of operands. These quantities can be interpreted as units of measurement in tokens.

The formula are:

  • Program length: N = N_1 + N_2
    There is a consistent interpretation of this equation: operators and operands are both kinds of tokens, and number of tokens can be interpreted as a length.
  • Calculated program length: hat{N} = eta_1 log_2 eta_1 + eta_2 log_2 eta_2
    There is a consistent interpretation of this equation: the operand of a logarithm has to be dimensionless, and the convention is to treat the operand as a ratio (if no denominator is specified, the value 1 is taken), the value returned is dimensionless, which can be multiplied by a variable having any kind of dimension; so again two (token) lengths are being added.
  • Volume: V = N * log_2 eta
    A volume has units of length^3 (i.e., it is created by multiplying three lengths). There is only one length in this equation; the equation is misnamed, it is a length.
  • Difficulty: D = {eta_1 / 2 } * {N_2 / eta_2}
    Here the dimensions of eta_1 and eta_2 cancel, leaving the dimensions of N_2 (a length); now Halstead is interpreting length as a difficulty unit (whatever that might be).
  • Effort: E =  D * V
    This equation multiplies two variables, both having a length dimension; the result should be interpreted as an area. In physics work is force times distance, and power is work per unit time; the term effort is not defined.

Halstead is claiming that a single dimension, program length, contains so much unique information that it can be used as a measure of a variety of disparate quantities.

Halstead’s colleagues at Purdue were rather damming in their analysis of these metrics. Their report Software Science Revisited: A Critical Analysis of the Theory and Its Empirical Support points out the lack of any theoretical foundation for some of the equations, that the analysis of the data was weak and that a more thorough analysis suggests theory and data don’t agree.

I pointed out in an earlier post, that people use Halstead’s metrics because everybody else does. This post is unlikely to change existing herd behavior, but it gives me another page to point people at, when people ask why I laugh at their use of these metrics.

C2X and undefined behavior

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

The ISO C Standard is currently being revised by WG14, to create C2X.

There is a rather nebulous clustering of people who want to stop compilers using undefined behaviors to generate what these people (and probably most other developers) consider to be very surprising code. For instance, always printing p is truep is false, when executing the code: bool p; if ( p ) printf("p is true"); if ( !p ) printf("p is false"); (possible because p is uninitialized, and accessing an uninitialized value is undefined behavior).

This sounds like a good thing; nobody wants compilers generating surprising code.

All the proposals I have seen, so far, involve doing away with constructs that can produce undefined behavior. Again, this sounds like a good thing; nobody likes undefined behaviors.

The problem is, there is a reason for labeling certain constructs as producing undefined behavior; the behavior is who-knows-what.

Now the C Standard could specify the who-knows-what behavior; for instance, it could specify that the result of dividing by zero is 42. Standard’s conforming compilers would then have to generate code to check whether the denominator was zero, and return 42 for this case (until Intel, ARM and other processor vendors ‘updated’ the behavior of their divide instructions). Way-back-when a design decision was made, the behavior of divide by zero is undefined, not 42 or any other value; this was a design decision, code efficiency and compactness was considered to be more important.

I have not seen anybody arguing that the behavior of divide by zero should be specified. But I have seen people arguing that once C’s integer representation is specified as being twos-compliment (currently it can also be ones-compliment or signed-magnitude), then arithmetic overflow becomes defined. Wrong.

Twos-compliment is a specification of a representation, not a specification of behavior. What is the behavior when the result of adding two integers cannot be represented? The result might be to wrap (the behavior expected by many developers), to saturate at the maximum value (frequently needed in image and signal processing), to raise a signal (overflow is not usually supposed to happen), or something else.

WG14 could define the behavior, for when the result of an arithmetic operation is not representable in the number of bits available. Standard’s conforming compilers targeting processors whose arithmetic instructions did not behave as required would have to generate code, for any operation that could overflow, to do what was necessary. The embedded market are heavy users of C; in this market memory is limited, and processor performance is never fast enough, the overhead of supporting a defined behavior could just be too high (a more attractive solution is to code review, to make sure the undefined behavior cannot occur).

Is there another way of addressing the issue of compiler writers’ use/misuse of undefined behavior? Yes, offer them money. Compiler writing is a business, at least at the level at which gcc and llvm operate. If people really are keen to influence the code generated by gcc and llvm, money is the solution. Wot, no money? Then stop complaining.

OSI licenses: number and survival

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

There is a lot of source code available which is said to be open source. One definition of open source is software that has an associated open source license. Along with promoting open source, the Open Source Initiative (OSI) has a rigorous review process for open source licenses (so they say, I have no expertise in this area), and have become the major licensing brand in this area.

Analyzing the use of licenses in source files and packages has become a niche research topic. The majority of source files don’t contain any license information, and, depending on language, many packages don’t include a license either (see Understanding the Usage, Impact, and Adoption of Non-OSI Approved Licenses). There is some evolution in license usage, i.e., changes of license terms.

I knew that a fair-few open source licenses had been created, but how many, and how long have they been in use?

I don’t know of any other work in this area, and the fastest way to get lots of information on open source licenses was to scrape the brand leader’s licensing page, using the Wayback Machine to obtain historical data. Starting in mid-2007, the OSI licensing page kept to a fixed format, making automatic extraction possible (via an awk script); there were few pages archived for 2000, 2001, and 2002, and no pages available for 2003, 2004, or 2005 (if you have any OSI license lists for these years, please send me a copy).

What do I now know?

Over the years OSI have listed 110 different open source licenses, and currently lists 81. The actual number of license names listed, since 2000, is 205; the ‘extra’ licenses are the result of naming differences, such as the use of dashes, inclusion of a bracketed acronym (or not), license vs License, etc.

Below is the Kaplan-Meier survival curve (with 95% confidence intervals) of licenses listed on the OSI licensing page (code+data):

Survival curve of OSI licenses.

How many license proposals have been submitted for review, but not been approved by OSI?

Patrick Masson, from the OSI, kindly replied to my query on number of license submissions. OSI don’t maintain a count, and what counts as a submission might be difficult to determine (OSI recently changed the review process to give a definitive rejection; they have also started providing a monthly review status). If any reader is keen, there is an archive of mailing list discussions on license submissions; trawling these would make a good thesis project :-)

The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

The Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 has been introduced to the US congress for consideration.

The Act applies to “person, partnership, or corporation” with “greater than $50,000,000 … annual gross receipts”, or “possesses or controls personal information on more than— 1,000,000 consumers; or 1,000,000 consumer devices;”.

What does this Act have to say?

(1) AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEM.—The term ‘‘automated decision system’’ means a computational process, including one derived from machine learning, statistics, or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, that makes a decision or facilitates human decision making, that impacts consumers.

That is all encompassing.

The following is what the Act is really all about, i.e., impact assessment.

(2) AUTOMATED DECISION SYSTEM IMPACT ASSESSMENT.—The term ‘‘automated decision system impact assessment’’ means a study evaluating an automated decision system and the automated decision system’s development process, including the design and training data of the automated decision system, for impacts on accuracy, fairness, bias, discrimination, privacy, and security that includes, at a minimum—

I think there is a typo in the following: “training, data” -> “training data”

(A) a detailed description of the automated decision system, its design, its training, data, and its purpose;

How many words are there in a “detailed description of the automated decision system”, and I’m guessing the wording has to be something a consumer might be expected to understand. It would take a book to describe most systems, but I suspect that a page or two is what the Act’s proposers have in mind.

(B) an assessment of the relative benefits and costs of the automated decision system in light of its purpose, taking into account relevant factors, including—

Whose “benefits and costs”? Is the Act requiring that companies do a cost benefit analysis of their own projects? What are the benefits to the customer, compared to a company not using such a computerized approach? The main one I can think of is that the customer gets offered a service that would probably be too expensive to offer if the analysis was done manually.

The potential costs to the customer are listed next:

(i) data minimization practices;

(ii) the duration for which personal information and the results of the automated decision system are stored;

(iii) what information about the automated decision system is available to consumers;

This act seems to be more about issues around data retention, privacy, and customers having the right to find out what data companies have about them

(iv) the extent to which consumers have access to the results of the automated decision system and may correct or object to its results; and

(v) the recipients of the results of the automated decision system;

What might the results be? Yes/No, on a load/job application decision, product recommendations are a few.

Some more potential costs to the customer:

(C) an assessment of the risks posed by the automated decision system to the privacy or security of personal information of consumers and the risks that the automated decision system may result in or contribute to inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting consumers; and

What is an “unfair” or “biased” decision? Machine learning finds patterns in data; when is a pattern in data considered to be unfair or biased?

In the UK, the sex discrimination act has resulted in car insurance companies not being able to offer women cheaper insurance than men (because women have less costly accidents). So the application form does not contain a gender question. But the applicants first name often provides a big clue, as to their gender. So a similar Act in the UK would require that computer-based insurance quote generation systems did not make use of information on the applicant’s first name. There is other, less reliable, information that could be used to estimate gender, e.g., height, plays sport, etc.

Lots of very hard questions to be answered here.

MI5 agent caught selling Huawei exploits on Russian hacker forums

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

An MI5 agent has been caught selling exploits in Huawei products, on an underground Russian hacker forum (a paper analyzing the operation of these forums; perhaps the researchers were hired as advisors). How did this news become public? A reporter heard Mr Wang Kit, a senior Huawei manager, complaining about not receiving a percentage of the exploit sale, to add to his quarterly sales report. A fair point, given that Huawei are funding a UK centre to search for vulnerabilities.

The ostensive purpose of the Huawei cyber security evaluation centre (funded by Huawei, but run by GCHQ; the UK’s signals intelligence agency), is to allay UK fears that Huawei have added back-doors to their products, that enable the Chinese government to listen in on customer communications.

If this cyber centre finds a vulnerability in a Huawei product, they may or may not tell Huawei about it. Obviously, if it’s an exploitable vulnerability, and they think that Huawei don’t know about it, they could pass the exploit along to the relevant UK government department.

If the centre decides to tell Huawei about the vulnerability, there are two good reasons to first try selling it, to shady characters of interest to the security services:

  • having an exploit to sell gives the person selling it credibility (of the shady technical kind), in ecosystems the security services are trying to penetrate,
  • it increases Huawei’s perception of the quality of the centre’s work; by increasing the number of exploits found by the centre, before they appear in the wild (the centre has to be careful not to sell too many exploits; assuming they manage to find more than a few). Being seen in the wild adds credibility to claims the centre makes about the importance of an exploit it discovered.

How might the centre go about calculating whether to hang onto an exploit, for UK government use, or to reveal it?

The centre’s staff could organized as two independent groups; if the same exploit is found by both groups, it is more likely to be found by other hackers, than an exploit found by just one group.

Perhaps GCHQ knows of other groups looking for Huawei exploits (e.g., the NSA in the US). Sharing information about exploits found, provides the information needed to more accurately estimate the likelihood of others discovering known exploits.

How might Huawei estimate the number of exploits MI5 are ‘selling’, before officially reporting them? Huawei probably have enough information to make a good estimate of the total number of exploits likely to exist in their products, but they also need to know the likelihood of discovering an exploit, per man-hour of effort. If Huawei have an internal team searching for exploits, they might have the data needed to estimate exploit discovery rate.

Another approach would be for Huawei to add a few exploits to the code, and then wait to see if they are used by GCHQ. In fact, if GCHQ accuse Huawei of adding a back-door to enable the Chinese government to spy on people, Huawei could claim that the code was added to check whether GCHQ was faithfully reporting all the exploits it found, and not keeping some for its own use.

The 2019 Huawei cyber security evaluation report

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

The UK’s Huawei cyber security evaluation centre oversight board has released it’s 2019 annual report.

The header and footer of every page contains the text “SECRET”, which I assume is its UK government security classification. It lends an air of mystique to what is otherwise a meandering management report.

Needless to say, the report contains the usually puffery, e.g., “HCSEC continues to have world-class security researchers…”. World class at what? I hear they have some really good mathematicians, but have serious problems attracting good software engineers (such people can be paid a lot more, and get to do more interesting work, in industry; the industry demand for mathematicians, outside of finance, is weak).

The most interesting sentence appears on page 11: “The general requirement is that all staff must have Developed Vetting (DV) security clearance, …”. Developed Vetting, is the most detailed and comprehensive form of security clearance in UK government (to quote Wikipedia).

Why do the centre’s staff have to have this level of security clearance?

The Huawei source code is not that secret (it can probably be found online, lurking in the dark corners of various security bulletin boards).

Is the real purpose of this cyber security evaluation centre, to find vulnerabilities in the source code of Huawei products, that GCHQ can then use to spy on people?

Or perhaps, this centre is used for training purposes, with staff moving on to work within GCHQ, after they have learned their trade on Huawei products?

The high level of security clearance applied to the centre’s work is the perfect smoke-screen.

The report claims to have found “Several hundred vulnerabilities and issues…”; a meaningless statement, e.g., this could mean one minor vulnerability and several hundred spelling mistakes. There is no comparison of the number of vulnerabilities found per effort invested, no comparison with previous years, no classification of the seriousness of the problems found, no mention of Huawei’s response (i.e., did Huawei agree that there was a problem).

How many vulnerabilities did the centre find that were reported by other people, e.g., the National Vulnerability Database? This information would give some indication of how good a job the centre was doing. Did this evaluation centre find the Huawei vulnerability recently disclosed by Microsoft? If not, why not? And if they did, why isn’t it in the 2019 report?

What about comparing the number of vulnerabilities found in Huawei products against the number found in vendors from the US, e.g., CISCO? Obviously back-doors placed in US products, at the behest of the NSA, need not be counted.

There is some technical material, starting on page 15. The configuration and component lifecycle management issues raised, sound like good points, from a cyber security perspective. From a commercial perspective, Huawei want to quickly respond to customer demand and a dynamic market; corners are likely to be cut off good practices every now and again. I don’t understand why the use of an unnamed real-time operating system was flagged: did some techie gripe slip through management review? What is a C preprocessor macro definition doing on page 29? This smacks of an attempt to gain some hacker street-cred.

Reading between the lines, I get the feeling that Huawei has been ignoring the centre’s recommendations for changes to their software development practices. If I were on the receiving end, I would probably ignore them too. People employed to do security evaluation are hired for their ability to find problems, not for their ability to make things that work; also, I imagine many are recent graduates, with little or no practical experience, who are just repeating what they remember from their course work.

Huawei should leverage its funding of a GCHQ spy training centre, to get some positive publicity from the UK government. Huawei wants people to feel confident that they are not being spied on, when they use Huawei products. If the government refuses to play ball, Huawei should shift its funding to a non-government, open evaluation center. Employees would not need any security clearance and would be free to give their opinions about the presence of vulnerabilities and ‘spying code’ in the source code of Huawei products.

Using Black-Scholes in software engineering gives a rough lower bound

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

In the financial world, a call option is a contract that gives the buyer the option (but not the obligation) to purchase an asset, at an agreed price, on an agreed date (from the other party to the contract).

If I think that the price of jelly beans is going to increase, and you disagree, then I might pay you a small amount of money for the right to buy a jar of jelly beans from you, in a month’s time, at today’s price. A month from now, if the price of Jelly beans has gone down, I buy a jar from whoever at the lower price, but if the price has gone up, you have to sell me a jar at the previously agreed price.

I’m in the money if the price of Jelly beans goes up, you are in the money if the price goes down (I paid you a premium for the right to purchase at what is known as the strike price).

Do you see any parallels with software development here?

Let’s say I have to rush to complete implementation some functionality by the end of the week. I might decide to forego complete testing, or following company coding practices, just to get the code out. At a later date I can decide to pay the time needed to correct my short-cuts; it is possible that the functionality is not used, so the rework is not needed.

This sounds like a call option (you might have thought of technical debt, which is, technically, the incorrect common usage term). I am both the buyer and seller of the contract. As the seller of the call option I received the premium of saved time, and the buyer pays a premium via the potential for things going wrong. Sometime later the seller might pay the price of sorting out the code.

A put option involves the right to sell (rather than buy).

In the financial world, speculators are interested in the optimal pricing of options, i.e., what should the premium, strike price and expiry date be for an asset having a given price volatility?

The Black-Scholes equation answers this question (and won its creators a Nobel prize).

Over the years, various people have noticed similarities between financial options thinking, and various software development activities. In fact people have noticed these similarities in a wide range of engineering activities, not just computing.

The term real options is used for options thinking outside of the financial world. The difference in terminology is important, because financial and engineering assets can have very different characteristics, e.g., financial assets are traded, while many engineering assets are sunk costs (such as drilling a hole in the ground).

I have been regularly encountering uses of the Black-Scholes equation, in my trawl through papers on the economics of software engineering (in some cases a whole PhD thesis). In most cases, the authors have clearly failed to appreciate that certain preconditions need to be met, before the Black-Scholes equation can be applied.

I now treat use of the Black-Scholes equation, in a software engineering paper, as reasonable cause for instant deletion of the pdf.

If you meet somebody talking about the use of Black-Scholes in software engineering, what questions should you ask them to find out whether they are just sprouting techno-babble?

  • American options are a better fit for software engineering problems; why are you using Black-Scholes? An American option allows the option to be exercised at any time up to the expiry date, while a European option can only be exercised on the expiry date. The Black-Scholes equation is a solution for European options (no optimal solution for American options is known). A sensible answer is that use of Black-Scholes provides a rough estimate of the lower bound of the asset value. If they don’t know the difference between American/European options, well…
  • Partially written source code is not a tradable asset; why are you using Black-Scholes? An assumption made in the derivation of the Black-Scholes equation is that the underlying assets are freely tradable, i.e., people can buy/sell them at will. Creating source code is a sunk cost, who would want to buy code that is not working? A sensible answer may be that use of Black-Scholes provides a rough estimate of the lower bound of the asset value (you can debate this point). If they don’t know about the tradable asset requirement, well…
  • How did you estimate the risk adjusted discount rate? Options involve balancing risks and getting values out of the Black-Scholes equation requires plugging in values for risk. Possible answers might include the terms replicating portfolio and marketed asset disclaimer (MAD). If they don’t know about risk adjusted discount rates, well…

If you want to learn more about real options: “Investment under uncertainty” by Dixit and Pindyck, is a great read if you understand differential equations, while “Real options” by Copeland and Antikarov contains plenty of hand holding (and you don’t need to know about differential equations).

Describing software engineering is terms of a traditional science

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

If you were asked to describe the ‘building stuff’ side of software engineering, by comparing it with one of the traditional sciences, which science would you choose?

I think a lot of people would want to compare it with Physics. Yes, physics envy is not restricted to the softer sciences of humanities and liberal arts. Unlike physics, software engineering is not governed by a handful of simple ‘laws’, it’s a messy collection of stuff.

I used to think that biology had all the necessary important characteristics needed to explain software engineering: evolution (of code and products), species (e.g., of editors), lifespan, and creatures are built from a small set of components (i.e., DNA or language constructs).

Now I’m beginning to think that chemistry has aspects that are a better fit for some important characteristics of software engineering. Chemists can combine atoms of their choosing to create whatever molecule takes their fancy (subject to bonding constraints, a kind of syntax and semantics for chemistry), and the continuing existence of a molecule does not depend on anything outside of itself; biological creatures need to be able to extract some form of nutrient from the environment in which they live (which is also a requirement of commercial software products, but not non-commercial ones). Individuals can create molecules, but creating new creatures (apart from human babies) is still a ways off.

In chemistry and software engineering, it’s all about emergent behaviors (in biology, behavior is just too complicated to reliably say much about). In theory the properties of a molecule can be calculated from the known behavior of its constituent components (e.g., the electrons, protons and neutrons), but the equations are so complicated it’s impractical to do so (apart from the most simple of molecules; new properties of water, two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, are still being discovered); the properties of programs could be deduced from the behavior its statements, but in practice it’s impractical.

What about the creative aspects of software engineering you ask? Again, chemistry is a much better fit than biology.

What about the craft aspect of software engineering? Again chemistry, or rather, alchemy.

Is there any characteristic that physics shares with software engineering? One that stands out is the ego of some of those involved. Describing, or creating, the universe nourishes large egos.

Altruistic innovation and the study of software economics

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

Recently, I have been reading rather a lot of papers that are ostensibly about the economics of markets where applications, licensed under an open source license, are readily available. I say ostensibly, because the authors have some very odd ideas about the activities of those involved in the production of open source.

Perhaps I am overly cynical, but I don’t think altruism is the primary motivation for developers writing open source. Yes, there is an altruistic component, but I would list enjoyment as the primary driver; developers enjoy solving problems that involve the production of software. On the commercial side, companies are involved with open source because of naked self-interest, e.g., commoditizing software that complements their products.

It may surprise you to learn that academic papers, written by economists, tend to be knee-deep in differential equations. As a physics/electronics undergraduate I got to spend lots of time studying various differential equations (each relating to some aspect of the workings of the Universe). Since graduating, I have rarely encountered them; that is, until I started reading economics papers (or at least trying to).

Using differential equations to model problems in economics sounds like a good idea, after all they have been used to do a really good job of modeling how the universe works. But the universe is governed by a few simple principles (or at least the bit we have access to is), and there is lots of experimental data about its behavior. Economic issues don’t appear to be governed by a few simple principles, and there is relatively little experimental data available.

Writing down a differential equation is easy, figuring out an analytic solution can be extremely difficult; the Navier-Stokes equations were written down 200-years ago, and we are still awaiting a general solution (solutions for a variety of special cases are known).

To keep their differential equations solvable, economists make lots of simplifying assumptions. Having obtained a solution to their equations, there is little or no evidence to compare it against. I cannot speak for economics in general, but those working on the economics of software are completely disconnected from reality.

What factors, other than altruism, do academic economists think are of major importance in open source? No, not constantly reinventing the wheel-barrow, but constantly innovating. Of course, everybody likes to think they are doing something new, but in practice it has probably been done before. Innovation is part of the business zeitgeist and academic economists are claiming to see it everywhere (and it does exist in their differential equations).

The economics of Linux vs. Microsoft Windows is a common comparison, i.e., open vs. close source; I have not seen any mention of other open source operating systems. How might an economic analysis of different open source operating systems be framed? How about: “An economic analysis of the relative enjoyment derived from writing an operating system, Linux vs BSD”? Or the joy of writing an editor, which must be lots of fun, given how many have text editors are available.

I have added the topics, altruism and innovation to my list of indicators of poor quality, used to judge whether its worth spending more than 10 seconds reading a paper.

Regression line fitted to nosy data? Ask to see confidence intervals

Derek Jones from The Shape of Code

A little knowledge can be a dangerous thing. For instance, knowing how to fit a regression line to a set of points, but not knowing how to figure out whether the fitted line makes any sense. Fitting a regression line is trivial, with most modern data analysis packages; it’s difficult to find data that any of them fail to fit to a straight line (even randomly selected points usually contain enough bias on one direction, to enable the fitting algorithm to converge).

Two techniques for checking the goodness-of-fit, of a regression line, are plotting confidence intervals and listing the p-value. The confidence interval approach is a great way to visualize the goodness-of-fit, with the added advantage of not needing any technical knowledge. The p-value approach is great for blinding people with science, and a necessary technicality when dealing with multidimensional data (unless you happen to have a Tardis).

In 2016, the Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company won the IEEE Computer Society/Software Engineering Institute Watts S. Humphrey Software Process Achievement (SPA) Award, and there is a technical report, which reads like an infomercial, on the benefits Nationwide achieved from using SEI’s software improvement process. Thanks to Edward Weller for the link.

Figure 6 of the informercial technical report caught my eye. The fitted regression line shows delivered productivity going up over time, but the data looks very noisy. How good a fit is that regression line?

Thanks to WebPlotDigitizer, I quickly extracted the data (I’m a regular user, and WebPlotDigitizer just keeps getting better).

Below is the data plotted to look like Figure 6, with the fitted regression line in pink (code+data). The original did not include tick marks on the axis. For the x-axis I assumed each point was at a fixed 2-month interval (matching the axis labels), and for the y-axis I picked the point just below the zero to measure length (so my measurements may be off by a constant multiplier close to one; multiplying values by a constant will not have any influence on calculating goodness-of-fit).

Nationwide: delivery productivity over time; extracted data and fitted regression line.

The p-value for the fitted line is 0.15; gee-wiz, you say. Plotting with confidence intervals (in red; the usual 95%) makes the situation clear:

Nationwide: delivery productivity over time; extracted data and fitted regression line with 5% confidence intervals.

Ok, so the fitted model is fairly meaningless from a technical perspective; the line might actually go down, rather than up (there is too much noise in the data to tell). Think of the actual line likely appearing somewhere in the curved red tube.

Do Nationwide, IEEE or SEI care? The IEEE need a company to award the prize to, SEI want to promote their services, and Nationwide want to convince the rest of the world that their IT services are getting better.

Is there a company out there who feels hard done-by, because they did not receive the award? Perhaps there is, but are their numbers any better than Nationwide’s?

How much influence did the numbers in Figure 6 have on the award decision? Perhaps not a lot, the other plots look like they would tell a similar tail of wide confidence intervals on any fitted lines (readers might like to try their hand drawing confidence intervals for Figure 9). Perhaps Nationwide was the only company considered.

Who are the losers here? Other companies who decide to spend lots of money adopting the SEI software process? If evidence was available, perhaps something concrete could be figured out.